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Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) benefit 
sanctions and labour market outcomes in 
Britain, 2001–2014
Martin Taulbut*, Daniel F Mackay† and Gerry McCartney*
The dominant view among British policy-makers is that benefit sanctions for the 
unemployed who are claiming the Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) are effective at 
increasing flows from unemployment into sustainable employment. This paper tests 
this theory using aggregate cross-sectional data for Great Britain for the period May 
2001 to December 2014. Descriptive analysis found the relationship between sanc-
tions and labour market outcomes was ambiguous, while trends in labour market 
outcomes were highly correlated with labour market demand. Multivariate SVAR 
time-series analysis, controlling for labour market demand, found evidence that 
changes in the threat and use of sanctions had a positive impact on flows into work 
in the short run but not in the long term, and had no definitive impact on ILO 
unemployment at all. Interrupted time-series analyses suggest we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the impact of introduction of a new JSA sanctions regime in 
October 2012 (with higher financial penalties associated with being sanctioned) had 
no impact on flows into work from JSA. In Britain, intensifying the use of sanctions 
and introducing harsher penalties associated with being sanctioned has been largely 
ineffective at increasing flows from JSA into sustainable employment. Given the 
negative financial and social impacts of sanctions on those affected, and the lack of 
evidence of a sustained positive impact on employment, the basis for the new sanc-
tions policy is unclear.
1. Introduction
In the UK, there is considerable public and policy interest in the impact of benefit sanc-
tions. As part of its welfare reform agenda, the UK Conservative–Liberal Democrat 
coalition government (2010–2015) presided over a large increase in the threat and use 
of benefits sanctions against unemployed people claiming the Job Seeker’s Allowance 
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(JSA). It also introduced a new sanctions regime for JSA claimants,1,2 with higher asso-
ciated financial penalties, in October 2012. The stated purpose of this approach was 
to encourage JSA claimants to search harder for employment and to discourage them 
from leaving work through misconduct or without good cause (DWP, 2012).
The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition justified this approach by arguing 
that increasing conditionality in this way is fairer for taxpayers, improves the efficient 
matching of unemployment benefit claimants with job opportunities and will improve 
long-term outcomes for individuals and families. Introducing changes in October 
2012, Mark Hoban, then Minister of State for Employment, argued these changes 
would both boost the speed at which claimants moved off benefits and into work 
and ‘maximises people’s chances of finding suitable work and be self-supporting’ (House of 
Commons General Committee, 2012). His successor Esther McVey, giving evidence 
to the House of Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee in 2015, reiterated 
this rationale, stating that ‘all the evidence international suggests sanctions do have a posi-
tive impact on people getting into work’ (Work and Pensions Select Committee, 2015).
The overall approach to active labour market policy might be described as a ‘sanc-
tioning activation’ regime (Brussig and Knuth, 2013). This explicitly emphasises rapid 
returns to the labour market (‘work first’) as a key measure of success, with strong 
punitive elements to increase the speed of this re-integration. It is less concerned about 
whether these jobs are sustainable or improving participants’ employability or health 
(Carter and Whitworth, 2017; Brussig and Knuth, 2013). This strategy has been found 
to have large positive employment impacts in the short term but has also been associ-
ated with lower wage rates and increased flows off benefits but not into work in the 
long term (OECD, 2005).
Evidence from outside the UK suggests benefit sanctions—and in particular the 
threat of sanctions—can influence flows off unemployment benefits and into employ-
ment (Venn, 2012). Boockmann et  al. (2014), in a study based on German data, 
found that sanctioned individuals were more likely to leave benefits for work within six 
months. A review of the literature on benefits sanctions by the Scottish government 
also suggested that sanctions can play a role in moving people from benefits into work. 
However, the same review also cautioned that many of those who were sanctioned 
and subsequently found work moved into low-paid, temporary employment (Scottish 
Government, 2013). Several studies have confirmed the finding that it is those who 
would find it most difficult to move into sustained employment, even in a buoyant 
economy (including the low skilled, those with health problems and lone parents), who 
are most likely to be sanctioned (Wu et al., 2006; Watts et al. 2014). As Immervoll and 
Scarpetta (2012) note: ‘an assessment of distributional effects is especially relevant when 
policy measures, such as strict benefit sanctions, are targeted towards highly disadvantaged 
groups’ (Immervoll and Scarpetta, 2012).
Very few quantitative studies have looked at the labour market impacts of JSA sanc-
tions within the UK. An early exception was Loopstra et al. (2015A), who examined 
1 In December 2012, it also introduced a new sanctions regime for those claiming the Employment 
Support Allowance (ESA), the main benefit for working-age adults unable to work due to long-term health 
conditions.
2 Strictly speaking, the new regime was adopted in Great Britain (Scotland, England and Wales). Northern 
Ireland delayed introducing many of the elements until 2016. It did not see its sanction rates increase as 
dramatically as the rest of the UK and, when finally introduced, the maximum period for which sanctions 
could be applied was 18 months, compared to three years in Great Britain.
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the association between sanctions, off-flows into work and employment outcomes in 
Britain. The authors concluded that an increase in the use of JSA benefit sanctions was 
associated with a reduction in the claimant count, but not with increased flows into 
work or reductions in unemployment. The National Audit Office (2016) also noted 
the scarcity of UK-specific evidence on unemployment benefits sanctions, highlighting 
that the DWP has not used its own data to evaluate the impact of sanctions and has 
not supported external work to understand their impact. The NAO’s own preliminary 
analysis found that for JSA claimants being sanctioned was associated with increased 
flows into employment, but also increased the number of days people spent neither 
working nor claiming benefits, and that changes to employment were not matched by 
an equivalent increase in earned income from employment. Both studies suggest that 
the effectiveness of the October 2012 regime in achieving positive, sustained labour 
market outcomes is at least contested.
A number of commentators have criticised the approach taken on social justice 
grounds, and particularly because of the detrimental impact on claimants’ health. They 
have focused on the dramatic rise in sanctions (peaking in October 2013), the incon-
sistent and arbitrary way in which they have been applied and their immediate conse-
quences to individuals who have been sanctioned and their families (National Audit 
Office, 2016; HoC, 2015). Wright and Stewart (2016) found evidence that JSA sanc-
tions had led to issues such as extreme financial hardship, debt and reliance on charity, 
friends and family as well as the triggering or exacerbation of health problems, espe-
cially mental health problems, while another study found that increased sanction rates 
were associated with increased food parcel distribution in the UK, even after adjust-
ment for local availability of food banks (Loopstra et  al., 2015B). These problems 
are compounded by concerns that those who face the most challenging personal cir-
cumstances (i.e. lone parents, people with disabilities, the homeless and young people 
leaving care) are disproportionately more likely to be sanctioned (Scottish Parliament, 
2014). From this perspective, a sanctions regime with higher financial penalties results 
in disproportionate social costs.
The labour market context in which sanctions are applied on individuals also seems 
to be important. The increase in the sanction rate (from 2010 to 2013) overlapped 
with a period of first economic stagnation, then recovery; while the changes to the 
sanctions regime (from 2012) took place during a period of economic recovery. While 
the most common reason for having a JSA benefit sanction applied on individuals 
in 2013 in Britain was for ‘not actively seeking work’ (Webster, 2014), there is some 
evidence that search intensity for work among the unemployed is pro-cyclical, declin-
ing in recession and increasing during recovery (Schwartz, 2014). Smith (2011) also 
presents some data to show that in the UK, the job-finding rate increased during a 
period of economic growth following the recession of the early 1990s. It may therefore 
be that changes in observed labour market outcomes are being driven at least in part 
by labour market conditions, rather than conditions being imposed on JSA claimants. 
Any analysis that attempts to separate out the distinct contribution of sanctions should 
take this into account.
In this context, it seems reasonable to test empirically the claims made about the 
beneficial impact of the increased use of sanctions (and on strengthening the penal-
ties associated with being sanctioned) on labour market outcomes in Britain. Through 
an examination of the relationship between trends in the threat and use of sanc-
tions, labour market demand (i.e. the rate of job vacancies per 1,000 working-age 
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population), flows into work from JSA and unemployment rates in Britain, we aim to 
answer the following questions:
 • What is the impact of changing the rate at which JSA sanctions were threatened and 
applied and the rate at which JSA leavers find work?
 • What is the impact of changing the rate at which JSA sanctions were threatened and 
applied and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) unemployment rate?
 • What was the independent effect of varying the JSA sanction ‘threat rate’ and ‘use 
rate’ on flows off JSA into employment and on ILO unemployment?
 • What was the independent effect of the new sanctions regime for JSA (introduced in 
October 2012) on flows off JSA into employment?
2. Methods
2.1. Data
2.1.1. Sanctions. Monthly JSA sanctions data for the period April 2000 to December 
2014 were obtained from DWP Stat-Xplore.3 Published sanctions data shown include 
both the total number of JSA claimants who have been referred for a sanction decision 
(where sanctions are ‘threatened’) and the total number of JSA claimants who have 
received an adverse sanction decision (where a sanction has been imposed, less those 
overturned on review, reconsideration or appeal, which is likely to understate the true 
sanction rate). Here we express both the referral and adverse decision figures as a rate 
per 100 JSA claimants per month. To create a consistent time series, these are shown 
as a rate per 100 of the adjusted claimant count: the published claimant count, plus 
off-flows into claimants recorded as ‘gone onto approved training’ or ‘transferred to 
government-supported training’. This was done to adjust for the different way JSA 
claimants moving into training were counted before and after the introduction of the 
Work Programme in June 2011. Prior to this date, claimants participating in govern-
ment-sponsored training programmes were treated as having left the claimant count; 
after it, they remained on the count.4 A mean was taken for October to September5 of 
each 12-month period for summary descriptive results, to remove some of the noise 
from the series and improve clarity of presentation. This should not be confused with 
the annual proportion of JSA claimants sanctioned, which is much higher than the 
monthly rate (Webster, 2016).
2.1.2. Exits from JSA into work. In theory, the threat and use of sanctions might be 
expected to act in two ways: by increasing the rate at which people exit JSA (whether 
they find work or not); and within this group, increasing the proportion who move into 
work (through increased search intensity). The outcome measure used here combines 
both aspects.
Exits from the Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) in Britain come from the claimant 
count off-flows record, a 100% count of all people leaving the benefit, which includes 
a record of leaver destinations recorded by the JSA40 form and provides monthly data 
going back to 1998. The leaver destination of interest here is ‘found work’.
3 Available at https://sw.stat-xplore.dwp.gov.uk.
4 Personal communication from Bob Watson, Office for National Statistics, 24 June 2014.
5 This time period was also chosen because the new sanctions regime was introduced in October.
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To create a consistent, comparable time series estimating the proportion of JSA leav-
ers moving into work, it was necessary to exclude four groups from the denominator. 
Claimants whose reason for leaving JSA was recorded as ‘not known’ or ‘failed to sign’ 
were removed because the share of off-flows in these categories has risen since the begin-
ning of the series. The ONS advice is that many of them are likely to have moved into 
employment. Claimants whose destination was recorded as ‘gone onto approved training’ 
or ‘transfer to government-supported training’ were also removed from the denominator, 
due to the changes in how these groups were defined after June 2011 as discussed above. 
This figure was then applied to the total off-flows per month, to estimate the number of 
claimants moving into work each month. The estimated result was then expressed as a rate 
per 100 JSA claimants per month, using the adjusted claimant count described previously.
This approach is likely to overstate exits from JSA into work. Survey evidence from 
2011, including the not known/failed to sign group, found a lower proportion of JSA 
leavers found work (78% vs. 68%) than the estimates used here (Adams et al., 2012). 
Differences between the two figures might partly be explained by differences in meth-
ods of data collection (survey versus administrative data) and partly by recall difficul-
ties (survey respondents were asked to report on their immediate destination after 
leaving benefits seven to eight months after ending their claim). The true figure is likely 
to lie somewhere between the two estimates.
2.1.3. ILO unemployment. Evidence on the broader labour market comes from the 
Labour Force Survey. Here the outcome of interest is ILO unemployment rates as a 
percentage of the economically active population. Since this is a survey-based measure, 
independent of the benefits administration system, it will count those who are unem-
ployed whether they are claiming unemployment benefits or not. If job seekers are 
gaining sustainable employment, it might be expected that if JSA exits increase, ILO 
unemployment rates will also fall. However, the effect of JSA sanctions on ILO unem-
ployment is likely to be limited by the fact that a large minority of unemployed people 
(28% to 33% in 2009–10) were not claiming JSA (DWP, 2017), and would therefore 
have been unaffected directly by the sanctions policy.
2.1.4. Labour market demand. Trends in labour market demand are derived from the 
ONS vacancy survey and the Labour Force Survey. The former is a monthly telephone 
survey of 6,000 employers designed to produce representative estimates of the level of 
vacancies in the UK. The measure of labour market demand is the rate of vacancies, 
per 1,000 people aged 16–64 years, per month. We use this in preference to the more 
conventional ‘Number of ILO unemployed people per vacancy’ to avoid circular logic, 
since unemployment is included as a labour market outcome.
A list of the variables used in the analyses and their definitions is shown in Table A.
2.2. Analytical approach
2.2.1. SVAR analysis. While the descriptive analysis provides an overview of trends in 
the threat and use of sanctions series, it does not take into account the interdependen-
cies and relationships between these series and labour market demand, unemployment 
and off-flows from JSA.
Structural vector auto-regression (SVAR), as described by Lutkepohl and Kratzig 
(2004), was therefore used to model the interdependencies and dynamics between 
the outcome variables (threats and application of sanctions per 100 JSA claimants, 
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off-flows into employment per 100 JSA claimants, job vacancy rate per 1,000 working-
age adults and the ILO unemployment rate) and the policy exposure variables (April 
2010 changes, October 2012 changes and the introduction of the Work Programme).
We modelled the impact of the application and threat of sanctions on the other inter-
related variables in the system such that: the application or threat of sanctions creates 
changes in the JSA claimant count, which in turn changes the number of job vacancies 
(as people take up jobs), which in turn changes the unemployment rate (as people are 
now in work).
The output from such a model can be voluminous with a large number of coef-
ficients that are not of direct interest; therefore, we calculated orthogonalised cumu-
lative impulse response functions (IRF). These plot the accumulated impact of the 
response of a series over a certain time period after it has been ‘shocked’ by another 
series. For our model this means looking at the accumulated impulse response of off-
flows from the JSA register, and of ILO unemployment to shocks in the threats of the 
use of sanctions and in the actual sanctions applied over a period of 18 months.
Since the labour market is affected by seasonality, many of the variables used exhibit 
a seasonal pattern. Vacancies and off-flows from JSA into work increase in the Autumn 
and in the Spring, but show sharp decreases in Winter and in Summer; the threat and 
use of sanctions follows a similar pattern. For unemployment, this pattern is reversed, 
with falls in unemployment observed in the Spring and Autumn and increases seen in 
Winter and Summer.
Preliminary investigation of the data showed a mix of stationary and non-stationary 
variables, so all variables were differenced once prior to estimation of the SVAR. We 
used the Hannan-Quinn (H-Q) and AIC statistics to determine the optimal number of 
lags to include in the model (Hannan and Quinn, 1979; Akaike, 1974). A deterministic 
trend variable was also included and its appropriateness tested using the AIC statistic. 
All SVAR analyses were conducted using Stata V 14.1.
The optimal number of lags chosen by the information criteria statistics for the 
model was seven. Diagnostic tests showed that some residual autocorrelation remained 
at lag 12, but the model passed all tests of normality of the residuals and satisfied the 
stability condition (Becketti, 2013).
2.2.2. Interrupted time-series regression. We also calculated the additional impact of 
exits into work from JSA and changes in ILO unemployment of the introduction 
Table A. Variables used in the analyses
Measure Definition
Revised claimant count JSA claimants plus people leaving JSA for approved training 
or government-supported training per month
Sanction threat rate Number of JSA claimants referred to be sanctioned per 100 
JSA claimants per month
Sanction use rate Number of JSA claimants sanctioned per 100 JSA claimants 
per month
Flows into employment from JSA Estimated number of people leaving JSA for work per 100 JSA 
claimants per month
Labour market demand Unfilled vacancies per 1000 working-age adults per month
ILO unemployment People meeting ILO definition of unemployment per 100 people 
in work or ILO unemployed
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of three policies, using time-series regression with ARIMA errors (Hyndman and 
Athanasopoulos, 2014). As the data were subject to a number of structural breaks over 
the period of analysis, we used the automatic outlier detection option in the PROC 
ARIMA routine in SAS 9.4 to identify the dates of the additive and level shift outliers 
and incorporated these into the time-series models. The three policies examined were:
 • The increase in penalties for missing an appointment with an advisor without good 
reason (April 2010). The anticipated impact on labour market outcomes of this 
change is unclear, since attending meetings does not necessarily increase job search 
intensity or effectiveness.
 • The introduction of the Work Programme, which replaced most previous DWP-
funded employment support for long-term benefit claimants (June 2011).
 • The introduction in October 2012 of 100% loss of unemployment benefits for a 
minimum period of four weeks and a maximum of three years, as potential penalties 
for JSA claimants. This might be expected to have a larger effect than the April 2010 
changes, given the step-change increase in severity of the financial consequences of 
being sanctioned it introduced, and the greater scope of JSA claimants affected.
The net impact of these policies was then calculated as the independent step-change 
impact of each policy, plus the cumulative impact of each policy between its month 
of introduction and December 2014. As an illustrative example, for the impact of the 
April 2010 changes, the mid-range estimates were calculated as:
 • the one-off step change of 14,089 extra off-flows into work PLUS
 • the monthly trend of –1,926 * 57 (–109,774)
giving a cumulative total of 95,685 fewer flows into work.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive analysis
Figure  1 shows time trends in the monthly threat and use rates of JSA sanctions, 
against exit rates from JSA into work rates for working-age adults, alongside our meas-
ure of labour market demand. Results are shown as 12-month annualised averages 
(October–September) to improve clarity of presentation.
Between 2000/01 and 2005/06, the referral rate for JSA sanctions was declining 
while the adverse decision rate remained stable. Over the same period, exits into 
employment from JSA declined for all working-age adults, while demand fluctuated at 
around 16 vacancies per 1,000 working-age adults, a relatively high rate compared to 
the 2008/09 to 2012/13 period.
There were steep increases in both the threat and use of sanctions between 2005/06 
and 2007/08, while demand for labour continued to fluctuate at a relatively high level. 
This was accompanied by a rise in exits from JSA into work.
Between 2008/09 and 2009/10, demand for labour declined rapidly as the economy 
moved into recession. Exits from JSA to work also decreased sharply, and both the 
threat and use of sanctions decreased.
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Demand for labour stagnated at a very low level (at around 12 vacancies per 1,000 
working-age people) between 2008/09 and 2011/12. During this period, the threat and 
use of sanctions increased steadily to levels higher than those seen in 2007/08, but exits 
rates from JSA into employment remained largely unchanged.
Between 2011/12 and 2012/13, there was a dramatic increase in the referrals for and 
use of JSA sanctions. This coincided with the new regime of penalties associated with 
conditions for claiming JSA (introduced in October 2012). This was accompanied by 
a modest increase in exits from JSA to work.
Finally, between 2012/13 and 2013/14, the economy grew; the referral rate for 
sanctions declined, though the adverse decision rate remained unchanged (and both 
remained at very high levels). There was a large rise in the exits to work.
Figure 2 presents the same data on sanctions and labour market demand, but this 
time includes trends in the ILO unemployment rate for working-age adults. The pre-
recession period as a whole shows no clear relationship between sanctions and unem-
ployment. It is noticeable that the increased threat and use of sanctions between 2005/06 
and 2007/08 was accompanied by no substantial change in ILO unemployment.
Figure 1. Annualised monthly threat and use rate of JSA sanctions and flows from JSA into 
employment: Britain, 2000/01 to 2013/14
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From 2008/09, as the threat and use of sanctions began its upward trajectory, ILO 
unemployment for all working-age adults continued to increase. It is noticeable that 
the increased use of sanctions between 2008/09 and 2011/12 had no discernible 
impact on unemployment, against a backdrop of stagnating demand. Indeed, ILO 
unemployment only began to fall between 2011/12 and 2012/13, as labour market 
demand increased. This reduction in unemployment rates accelerated to 2013/14, with 
steep falls in unemployment accompanied by steep increases in the measure of labour 
market demand.
3.2. What was the impact of changes in the JSA sanction ‘threat rate’ and ‘use rate’ on 
flows off JSA into employment?
Figure 3 shows the cumulative effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the JSA 
sanction ‘threat rate’ over 18 months. There is evidence of a short-run effect in the first 
month, but the impact is volatile thereafter and the accumulated effect drops to fluctuate 
Figure 2. Annualised monthly threat and use rate of JSA sanctions and ILO unemployment rate: 
Britain, 2000/01 to 2013/14
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around zero around after six months. A one-standard-deviation increase (of 0.57 sanc-
tions per 100 JSA claimants per month) leads to a decrease in off-flows into work of 0.08 
people per 100 claimants after 18 months. Similarly, there is almost no impact on off-
flows into work after 6 months from increases in the rate at which sanctions are applied, 
although there is a short-run positive effect (Figure 4). Numerically, an increase of 0.27 
sanctions per 100 JSA claimants per month leads to an accumulated impact of 0.013 
off-flows per 100 claimants after 18 months. Increasing the rate at which sanctions are 
threatened or applied increases flows off JSA into work in the very short run, but there is 
no evidence of a long-term, positive effect on JSA off-flows into work.
3.3. What was the impact of varying the JSA sanction ‘threat rate’ and ‘use rate’ on ILO 
unemployment?
Wide confidence intervals mean that there is little evidence that increasing the sanction 
threat rate reduces ILO unemployment either in the short or the long run (Figure 5). 
Similarly, a one-standard-deviation increase in the rate at which sanctions are actually 
applied does not appear to have any cumulative impact on ILO unemployment rates, 
either in the short run or the long run (Figure 6). Taken together with the descriptive 
analysis and the impact on flows of JSA into work described above, this seems to sug-
gest that increasing the threat and use of sanctions may encourage flows off unemploy-
ment benefits into work for a few people in the short run but has little impact on the 
wider labour market.
3.4. What was the effect of the new sanctions regime on flows off JSA into employment?
Table  1 shows the independent impacts of: the introduction of sanctions for fail-
ing to attend an Interview at the Job Centre ‘without good reason’ (April 2010); the 
Figure 3. Accumulated flows into work from JSA from a one standard deviation increase in the 
threat of sanctions rate (over 18-months)
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introduction of the Work Programme (June 2011); and the introduction of the October 
2012 sanctions regime, on off-flows from JSA into work after controlling for three 
structural breaks in the data.
Figure 4. Accumulated flows into work from JSA from a one-standard deviation increase in the use 
of sanctions (over 18-months)
Figure 5. Accumulated change in ILO unemployment from a one-standard deviation increase in the 
threat of sanctions (over 18-months)
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The impact of the April 2010 changes to the sanctions regime in the short and longer 
term is uncertain. The October 2012 sanctions have mixed effects with an immediate 
decrease in people moving into work from JSA, but an uncertain change in the trend.
Table 2 summarises the cumulative effects of the three policies, using the data from 
Table 1 and the approach described in the methods. The independent impact of all 
three policies is uncertain, and we are unable to reject definitively the null hypothesis 
for any of them. The April 2010 changes are estimated to have lowered flows off JSA 
into work by 95,685 (95% CI –302,305 to 110,935). For the Work Programme, the 
Table 1. Interrupted time-series analysis of the independent impact of policy changes on the level and 
trend of JSA off-flows into employment adjusted for labour market demand and sanctions applied
Coefficient (95% CI) p value
Underlying trend –170 (–360 to 22) 0.08
April 2010 (STEP) 14,100(–7,500 to 35,700) 0.20
April 2010 (TREND) –1,900(–5,200 to 1,300) 0.24
October 2012 (STEP) –27,300 (–52,000 to –2,600) 0.03
October 2012 (TREND) 1,990 (–1,500 to 5,500) 0.27
Work Programme (STEP) 10,800(–20,000 to 41,500) 0.49
Work Programme (TREND) 2,400 (–1,800 to 6,500) 0.26
Number of sanctions applied 1.47 (0.72 to 2.23) <0.001
Labour market demand –0.23 (–0.31 to –0.15) <0.001
Constant 262,800 (204,300 to 321,200) <0.001
Notes: Time-series regression with ARMA errors: AR(1,3,6,10,12,16) ma(3); results rounded to improve clarity.
Figure 6. Accumulated change in ILO unemployment from a one-standard deviation increase in the 
use of sanctions (over 18-months)
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mid-range estimate is of an additional 112,919 (95% CI –95,859 to 321,697) people 
moving into work between June 2011 and December 2014.6 Finally, we are unable to 
reject the null hypothesis that the post-October 2012 regime had no impact on flows 
off JSA into work, given the uncertainty of its small positive impact of 26,328 (–93,564 
to 146,221).
4. Discussion
4.1. Implications
Overall, the descriptive analysis suggests the relationship between the threat and use 
of JSA sanctions and labour market outcomes in Britain remains ambiguous and posi-
tive labour market outcomes were highly correlated with labour market demand. In 
the pre-recession period, there is some evidence that increased threat and use of JSA 
sanctions was associated with modest increases in exits from JSA to work, but also with 
increases in ILO unemployment, implying the process was associated with increased 
labour market ‘churn’. During the period of weak labour market demand between 
2008/09 and 2011/12, increasing the threat and use of sanctions had little positive 
impact on either labour market outcome. In terms of timing, improved labour market 
outcomes (falling ILO unemployment and increased exits from JSA to work) after 
2012 could reflect a loosening of fiscal policy and substantial use of quantitative easing 
(Wren-Lewis, 2015) as much as any welfare reforms.
The SVAR multivariate analysis suggests that changes to the rate at which sanctions 
are threatened or applied in Britain have a short-term impact on increasing flows into 
work from JSA, but this effect largely disappears after 6 months. Changing the rate 
at which JSA sanctions were threatened or applied had no noticeable impact on the 
ILO unemployment rate, once labour market demand is taken into account. After 
18 months, the cumulative impact of increasing the threat or use of sanctions is either 
negative or close to zero (with wide confidence intervals) for both outcome measures.
Our final piece of analysis, looking at the impact of policy interventions, suggests that 
the sanctions regime introduced in October 2012 was largely ineffective in increasing 
flows into work from JSA once other factors are taken into account. We are unable to 
Table 2. Net cumulative effect of interventions on flows into employment from JSA to December 
2014 (start date of intervention in parentheses)
Estimated cumulative number of additional people 
moving from JSA into employment (95% CI)
April 2010 changes –95,685 (–302,305 to 110,935)
Work Programme (June 2011) 112,919 (–95,859 to 321,697)
October 2012 changes 26,328 (–93,564 to 146,221)
Source: Authors’ calculations from unrounded outputs. Negative numbers suggest intervention reduced 
the number of people moving from JSA into employment.
6 This should be compared with Work Programme official statistics which reported 376,040 job outcomes 
for JSA claimants to December 2014. This implies that between 14% and 100% (central estimate: 70%) of 
participants would have gained employment anyway.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/cje/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/cje/bex088/4827894
by University of Glasgow user
on 20 February 2018
Page 14 of 18  M. Taulbut et al.
work could explore these issues in more depth, investigating the association between 
labour market outcomes and JSA sanctions at a regional and sub-regional level. Any 
approach would, however, have to consider what measures of sub-national labour mar-
ket demand might be appropriate, given that the ONS vacancy survey does not provide 
results below the UK level.
We also were limited in the population subgroups that we were able to consider, 
and it is likely that some of these experienced differential impacts or exposures: young 
adults are an obvious example, but lone parents, adults with disabilities and other 
groups claiming JSA could also be considered. In a recent paper, Reeves (2017) found 
that JSA sanction rates were higher in areas with a greater proportion of lone parents 
and people with disabilities. Investigating any changes in labour market outcomes for 
these groups, using the same geographies, would be a useful piece of research. Finally, 
we were unable to consider other outcomes (e.g. earnings, household incomes, mental 
and physical health) seen after the introduction of the October 2012 sanctions regime. 
The unintended or less explicit consequences of the policy change should also be bet-
ter understood. For example, it may be that more advantaged job seekers are leaving 
benefits for full-time education via temporary employment, while the least advantaged 
move from benefits to temporary work to unemployment or inactivity but with their 
financial support now coming from family, friends and charities rather than the State. 
A number of research projects are currently underway to explore data linkage between 
DWP administrative datasets and a range of labour market and social outcomes, which 
could yield more robust analysis in the future.
5. Conclusion
Based on analysis of data for Britain for the period 2001–2014, the increased threat 
and use of sanctions, including the introduction of the new sanctions regime in 
October 2012, did not result in sustained improvements in labour market outcomes. 
This objective might be better served by alternative active labour market policies, such 
as more substantive commitment to addressing personal circumstances which prevent 
people from gaining and remaining in employment (such as childcare and health prob-
lems) and ensuring a greater supply of job opportunities, especially for the low-skilled 
and those living in areas of weak labour market demand.
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4.2. Strengths and limitations
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Table 3. The additional number of individuals referred for a sanction decision, actually sanctioned 
and moving into work (October 2012–December 2014)
Number of additional individuals
Individuals referred at least once 1,555,787
Individuals sanctioned at least once 925,561
Extra flows into employment (95% CI) 26,328 (–93,564 to 146,221)
Sources: Table 2; DWP Stat X-plore.
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these groups, using the same geographies, would be a useful piece of research. Finally, 
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The unintended or less explicit consequences of the policy change should also be bet-
ter understood. For example, it may be that more advantaged job seekers are leaving 
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move from benefits to temporary work to unemployment or inactivity but with their 
financial support now coming from family, friends and charities rather than the State. 
A number of research projects are currently underway to explore data linkage between 
DWP administrative datasets and a range of labour market and social outcomes, which 
could yield more robust analysis in the future.
5. Conclusion
Based on analysis of data for Britain for the period 2001–2014, the increased threat 
and use of sanctions, including the introduction of the new sanctions regime in 
October 2012, did not result in sustained improvements in labour market outcomes. 
This objective might be better served by alternative active labour market policies, such 
as more substantive commitment to addressing personal circumstances which prevent 
people from gaining and remaining in employment (such as childcare and health prob-
lems) and ensuring a greater supply of job opportunities, especially for the low-skilled 
and those living in areas of weak labour market demand.
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Appendix 1. SVAR Models
This appendix sets out in more detail the SVAR models we have estimated in our paper. 
We estimated two SVAR models. Model 1 consisted of the following four endogenous 
variables: threats of sanctions; JSA claimant count; job vacancies and unemployment. 
The model was augmented with four exogenous variables: a time trend and the three 
policy exposure variables ‘stricter sanctions’, ‘tougher sanctions’ and ‘introduction of 
the Work Programme’.
The endogenous variables in the second SVAR model consisted of: sanctions 
applied; JSA claimant count; job vacancies and unemployment. This model was also 
augmented with the four exogenous variables included in model 1. In standard SVAR 
matrix notation, model 1 can be written in structural form as:
 A y   y  x  Bt o 1 t 1 2 t t= + + +−ζ εΓ Γ  (1)
where:
y = [threats, claimants, vacancies, unemp]’
x = [time, stricter, tougher, workprog]’
ε = [εthreats, εclaimants, εvacancies, εunemp]’
where the matrix A allows us to obtain the contemporaneous effect of the variables 
on each other. After multiplying through by A- 1, we obtain the standard VAR reduced 
form:
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structural form (equation 1) is not identified (Enders, 2010). That is, we cannot get an 
estimate of all the parameters in (1) using the reduced form (2). However, identifica-
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ensured that the restrictions complied with our underlying theoretical model of threats 
and sanctions:
Threats      JSA count       Vacancies       Unemployment
All of the above can also be applied to our second SVAR model that uses sanctions 
applied instead of threats.
Interrupted Time-Series Regression with ARIMA errors
We used interrupted time-series regression with ARMA errors to estimate the numbers 
transitioning into employment as a result of the three policy interventions. An ARMA 
errors model was preferred over a pure ARMA model, as the coefficients obtained via 
ARMA errors retain the traditional regression interpretation whilst those of a pure 
ARMA do not (Hyndman, 2010).
Thus, the form of the model estimated was:
Off - flows = C
t i it t
b x u0 1+ +=∑ jn
where ut follows an ARIMA structure and X is a vector of covariates.
→ → →
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